How to Do Conspiracy Theory with Fetishism: The Myth of the "Slain King" by Bakola, Emily
How to Do Conspiracy Theory with Fetishism:
The Myth of the “Slain King”
Emily Bakola
The John F. Kennedy assassination has been, without a doubt, one of the
darkest moments in twentieth-century United States history. For the past
four decades, this traumatic event has inspired and fueled a plethora of
conspiratorial visual narratives―“crisis” films―that seek to oppose and
question the official historical record. The formation of conspiracy
theories, both as cultural and artistic events, has been inextricably linked
to the pathological condition of paranoia. This article attempts to divorce
conspiracy from the theoretical framework of paranoia by arguing that
in the case of Oliver Stone’s controversial film JFK (1991) what informs
and drives the narrative is not paranoia, but rather fetishism. Fetishism
here functions as a type of defense mechanism, a means of dealing and
coping with crisis. Exploring JFK through the theoretical framework of
fetishism highlights some of the reasons why the film was met with
extreme criticism as well as some of the ways the cinematic apparatus
responds and creatively de-stabilizes the historical record.  
“It’s a mystery wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma.”
—David Ferrie in Oliver Stone’s JFK (1991)
Introduction
n Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary
Hollywood Film (1988), Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner describe
the sixties and seventies as a period when the United States “underwent
a ‘legitimacy crisis.’ Major institutions that previously had been fairly
immune to significant popular criticism lost the confidence of the American
people” (49). This crisis, they note, was a direct response to real events—
political, economic, and social—and can have two kinds of effects: “it can
I
promote a regressive reaction, whereby more familiar and secure traditional
social models and cultural representations are revived, or it can lead to a
progressive attempt to construct new representational codes and social
attitudes” (49).1 The authors argue that the Hollywood liberal “crisis films”
of the seventies take a more conservative turn in the eighties and are
symptomatic of a deep desire in the American people to restore the “crisis
of confidence” in public and private institutions, move away from the
pessimism and cynicism that characterized the mid-seventies, re-establish
optimism, and regain the lost faith in government and business.2 Crisis films
continue, to this day, to draw audiences in movie theaters all around the
world, revisiting and, often, revising major historical events.
One of the most popular branches of Hollywood “crisis” films has been
the conspiracy genre. Conspiracy theories have been an endless source of fear,
fascination, and frustration, especially during the latter half of the twentieth
century. In an age defined by a growing tendency to re-think, revise, and re-
articulate the historical past, recent or distant, conspiracy theories have been,
by far, the most appealing and popular way of interrogating history and, in
effect, historiography. Although they have been around for centuries, their
renaissance began in the early 1960s, with the most devastating event in the
United States up until that moment: the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy.3 The hyper-production of an exponentially growing body of
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1. Some of the events Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner mention include the
Watergate scandal and the Pentagon Papers both of which had cast a shadow over the
executive branch and the legitimacy of the presidency. Directors such as Sidney
Pollack and Alan J. Pakula create memorable “crisis” films such as All the
President’s Men (1976) and Three Days of the Condor (1975). 
2. According to the authors, there are different types of crisis films; examples include
Jaws (Dir. Steven Spielberg, 1975), The Exorcist (Dir. William Friedkin, 1973),
Airport (Dir. George Seaton, 1970), and The Conversation (Dir. Francis Ford
Coppola, 1974). 
3. The Center for Conspiracy Culture was launched in 1998 by Peter Knight, a
professor at the University of Manchester, and Alasdair Parks, a professor at the
University of Winchester. The collaboration was inspired by an international
conference held at the University of Winchester (King Alfred’s College at the
time) that same year. The conference invited papers “on any aspect of the culture of
conspiracy, paranoia & alternative knowledge, focusing predominantly—but not
exclusively—on the United States, and on the period 1945 to the present.” Their
main goal is to “examine the role of conspiracy in contemporary world, and
especially the United States.” The Center perceives the Kennedy assassination as the
“primal scenario in contemporary conspiracy thinking.” For more information visit
<http://www2.winchester.ac.uk/ccc/index.htm>.
“crisis” texts—literary, scientific, theoretical, and cinematic—raises
questions about the reasons that still give rise to such conspiracy theories,
as well as about the underlying mechanisms of their practice.4
In Running Dog (1978), Don DeLillo describes our times as “the age of
conspiracy, the age of connections, links, secret relationships” (111).
Timothy Melley notes that major news magazines have recently described
the U.S. as “a nation in the grip of ‘conspiracy mania,’ ” and have
pronounced the arrival of a “ ‘new paranoid style in the American Arts’ ”
(7). This crisis in interpretation is in part a product of the constant political
shifts between liberal and conservative ideologies. The growing pessimism
and mistrust of the government and its agencies as well as the intense
anxiety over powerful corporations in the sixties and seventies come in to
replace, if only for a short time, the conservative fifties. Cold War paranoia
ensured a clear, identifiable “enemy”; Cold War rhetoric redefined ideals
such as freedom, patriotism, nationalism. 
Conspiratorial thought has been inextricably linked to the pathological
condition of paranoia. The two have been so tightly bound in a cause-effect
relationship, it would seem almost impossible to come across a text on
conspiracy theory that is not informed by the theoretical framework of
paranoia. This essay introduces a third concept into this relationship whose
long pejorative connotative and denotative meanings have stigmatized both
individuals and practices in a manner similar to that of conspiracy theorists:
that is the concept of fetishism. Historically, all three terms have been
employed in a rather overgeneralized and negative manner to describe
practices standing against dominant ideologies of normalcy and rational
behavior.5 This overgeneralized use, however, can often mask the
ideological subtleties as well as the heterogeneity that characterizes
conspiracy, paranoia, and fetishism, both in terms of structure and function.
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4. See O’Donnell; Simon; Melley. Also films such as The Conversation (Dir. Francis
Ford Coppola, 1973) and Blow Out (Dir. Brian De Palma, 1981) have been
understood as indirect commentaries of the Zapruder film and its failure to provide
concrete answers about the Kennedy assassination.
5. In Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (1999), Mark
Fenster offers an insightful discussion about conspiracy theory as “an interpretive
practice” that works “as a form of hyperactive semiosis in which history and politics
serve as reservoirs of signs that demand (over)interpretation, and that signify, for the
interpreter, far more than their conventional meaning” (xvii). The underlying
mechanisms of paranoia at work inform Fenster’s discussion especially in the
political arena. Popular definitions of paranoia and fetishism are included. 
14
The question that arises here is this: can we have conspiracy theory without
paranoia? In other words, can we understand conspiracy theory outside
paranoid modes of thought? Can we perceive it as anything other than a
symptom, a manifestation of pathology in moments of intense crises? 
This essay suggests that in a specific type of conspiracy theory the
primary mechanism of coping with crisis is not paranoia but rather
fetishism. A key assumption is that none of these concepts is monolithic;
there are different types of fetishism, paranoia, and conspiracy theory, and
with each type certain mechanisms become more dominant than others. The
J. F. Kennedy assassination had inspired countless paranoid narratives—
visual and literary—in the seventies and eighties; in the nineties, however,
one might observe a slight change in aesthetic and narrative patterns. The
persistence of producing and reproducing texts about Kennedy suggests a
crisis that is intermittent, an acting out (rather than a working through) of a
deep and permanent trauma. We will begin by considering the similarities
between conspiracy theory and fetishism, both as strategies of coping with
crisis and allaying anxiety. Although I will be using the generic term of
conspiracy theory (CT), the focus still will remain on the conspiracies
dealing with historical figures gradually transformed to mythic figures,
sacred objects of special devotion. We will then proceed to investigate both
the clinical and cultural definitions of paranoia, and finally, explore Oliver
Stone’s controversial film JFK (1991) as a case study of the primary role
fetishism appears to have in this particular narrative. 
Conspiracy Theory, Paranoia, Fetishism
What is a conspiracy theory? Adrian Quinn sees it as “a contradiction
in terms.” He defines theory as “a body of principles that attempt to develop
clear, logical explanations for things,” but at the same time sees conspiracy
as “necessarily a highly selective and convoluted model finding evidence
anywhere, even in the very lack of evidence” (112).6 Hence, he feels that
conspiracy is less a theory than “a hunch or a suspicion” (112). Jane Parish
argues that what conspiracy theory does is “take on what Englund and
Leach call the meta-narrative of modernity” (6). Parish notes: “the
popularity of the ‘traditional’ conspiracy lies in its function to provide neat
explanations in an untidy and big world where there is no great center
anymore” (6). In other words, conspiracy theory becomes a source of
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6. See Quinn.
comfort in an anti-determinist fashion, as it asserts that no one acts alone
and things never accidentally happen; people make them happen.
The most basic common feature that CT and fetishism share is that both
carry the stigma of inauthenticity, being characterized as false relationships
between subject and object. From a psychoanalytic perspective, both seem
to originate in loss, and both involve processes of disavowal, as there is a
direct conflict about knowledge and belief.7 For the classical conspiracy
theorist, loss pertains mainly to “truth”; in this case, however, as we shall
discuss later, a conspiratorial text seeks to compensate for a different kind
of loss. Both appear highly selective and arbitrary in nature; in CT and
fetishism objects attain special meaning largely through the manner in
which they relate to other objects, as both, by definition, describe a
relationship; both function as defense mechanisms for coping with an
unacceptable reality and strive to allay anxiety; and, finally, both practices
despite social condemnation are still going strong. 
In addition, CT and fetishism are largely faith-based. In Empire of
Conspiracy: the Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (2000), Timothy
Melley notes that “[b]ecause [conspiracy theories] are so difficult to
confirm, they require a form of quasi-religious conviction, a sense that the
conspiracy in question is an entity with almost supernatural powers” (8).
Similarly, fetishism cannot confirm or validate the special power an object
holds for the individual, whose personal relationship to the putative object is
usually perceived as irrational by society. David R. Shumway asserts that,
“ ‘[f]etishism’ in all its uses describes the attribution of strange powers
to objects” (7, my emphasis). From Melley’s assertions, we can argue,
accordingly, that conspiracy theory describes the world largely through the
attribution of special powers to objects (be it in the form of individuals,
social or political institutions, religious sectors, etc.). Or, perhaps, we can
say that conspiracy theory describes the world largely through fetishism.
Paranoia, the third part of the equation, is not monolithic, even though
the generic application of the term has made it almost impossible to
differentiate among the various types, or divorce it from conspiracy. The
subject of Sigmund Freud’s major study of paranoia was Daniel Paul
Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1903), through which Freud
linked overt persecutory delusions to latent homosexuality. Schreber was
convinced that the world was out to get him, yet maintained the cognitive
capacity to document his own delusions, hallucinations, and fears, in a
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7. Freud, “Fetishism.”
manner indicating a frighteningly lucid awareness of his mental condition.
In cases such as this, paranoia is defined in the Collins English Dictionary
as a condition where individuals “wrongly believe that other people are
trying to harm them, or believe themselves to be much more important than
they really are.” A somewhat different type of paranoia is what Melley calls
“operational paranoia,” a condition marked by an intense “self-critical
suspicion of the world” (18). This latter type is much more frequent and
much less severe, and has often been the force that drives characters in
literature, film, and everyday life. 
The Greek literal meaning of paranoia also refers to an excess, a surplus
of knowledge. Melley’s analysis of conspiracy narratives in relation to these
two distinct types of paranoia finds resonance with this understanding of the
term. Melley notes:
This distinction [between operational and schizophrenic] would
be of use in isolating cases … that arise frequently in postwar
narrative: cases where individuals not only suspect an array
of invisible determinants to be at work but also suspect their
own suspicions. The secondary suspicion seems to indicate the
process of a rational, self-effacing, skeptical mind-precisely the
opposite of irrational or delusional self-inflation. (19, emphasis
in original) 
Louis A. Sass’ seminal work on Schreber’s Memoirs successfully argues
that the latter’s condition might be characterized as one of hypercognitivity
and excessive self-reflection, and even goes on to say that the Memoirs is a
work of a brilliant mind.8 William G. Niederland offers his own list of
symptoms regarding the paranoid individual:
Paranoia and paranoid conditions are characterized by hostility,
suspiciousness, persecutory ideas, perceptual distortions,
regressive tendencies, expansive grandiosity, delusional
thinking, excessive righteousness, and, in severe cases, a break
with reality. The paranoid individual is easily slighted (“people
are against me”). He sees himself persecuted by malevolent
figures (“enemies”). He may become mood and depressed
because he feels menaced by conspiratorial opponents, by
“overheard” accusatory remarks, by “observed” inimical
actions, and/or by hostile “plots” against him. (29) 
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8. See Sass 242-67.
Finally, in Paranoia: New Psychoanalytic Perspectives (1994), John M.
Oldham and Stanley Bone cite DSM III-R’s official criteria for the
diagnosis of paranoia:
A pervasive and unwarranted tendency, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, to interpret the
actions of people as deliberately demeaning or threatening, as
indicated by at least four of the following:
i. Expects, without sufficient basis, to be exploited or harmed by
others.
ii. Questions, without justification, the loyalty or trustworthiness
of friends or associates.
iii. Reads hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign
remarks or events, e.g. suspects that a neighbor put out trash to
annoy him.
iv. Bears grudges or is unforgiving of insults or slights.
v. Is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear
that the information will be used against him or her.
vi. Is easily slighted and quick to react with anger or to
counterattack.
vii. Questions, without justification, fidelity of spouse or sexual
partner.9 (4)
The above references indicate why conspiracy and paranoia often go hand in
hand. All diagnoses posit that one of the primary elements of the paranoiac
is the feeling of grandeur and megalomania, a condition also similar to
narcissism. Megalomania is a necessary ingredient, without which it would
be difficult to account for an individual feeling so special or important that
his or her specialness becomes a threat to the rest of the world. At the same
time, though, all clinical definitions of paranoia appear somewhat generic,
failing to account for specific types of conspiratorial thought. The cultural
appropriation of the term as a hermeneutic tool for “abnormal” thought and
behavior draws from such clinical definitions, and as such, it also fails to
capture the specificity of conspiracy as a cultural phenomenon. In CTs
revolving around religion or political systems, one can observe the “they’re-
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9. This is a very insightful study on paranoia, which partly employs Melanie Klein’s
object relations theory of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Although I
will not be employing Kleinian psychoanalytic theory here, I still believe Klein’s
theory can also be related to fetishism. 
out-to-get-me-and-mine attitude” with much more ease. Political and
religious propaganda has cultivated paranoia for centuries; there are a
plethora of texts dedicated to exposing the “real” motives of Catholics, Jews,
Communists, Conservatives, Liberals, and the like. In CTs, however, where
the subject is not implicated—directly or indirectly—paranoia takes on a
different role.
The types of CT dealing with entire social, religious, or political groups
can be usually explored through the aforementioned clinical and cultural
definitions, even though there are still specific aspects that fail to be
accounted for. What happens, however, when CT is not a product of a
megalomaniac narcissist driven by grandiosity and self-importance? How
can we account for the ways the individual relates to the world? Freud
introduces the concept of narcissism in his paper on Leonardo da Vinci in
1910, just before he writes on the Schreber case, in which he strongly
emphasizes the role of narcissism in paranoia.10 His essay “On Narcissism”
follows in 1914. In the cultural fixation with figures such as JFK, however,
the attitude ceases to be “they’re all out to get me” and becomes “they’re all
out to get him.” This form of conviction still contains the paranoid element
of intense suspicion of the world, but at the same time, narcissism and
megalomania become difficult to sustain as driving forces behind
conspiratorial thinking. It is here, one might argue that narcissism gives way
to fetishism becoming the dominant element, both in anthropological and
psychoanalytic terms.
William Pietz’s groundbreaking work on anthropological fetishism
identifies four themes informing the idea of the fetish:
(1) the untranscended materiality of the fetish: “matter,” or the
material object, is viewed as the locus of religious activity or
psychic investment;
(2) the radical historicity of the fetish’s origin: arising in a
singular event fixing together otherwise heterogeneous
elements, the identity and power of the fetish consists in its
enduring capacity to repeat this singular process of fixation,
along with the resultant effect;
(3) the dependence of the fetish for its meaning and value on a
particular order of social relations, which it in turn reinforces;
and
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10. Freud, “Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood.”
(4) the active relation of the fetish object to the individual: a kind
of external controlling organ directed by powers outside the
affected person’s will, the fetish represents a subversion of
the ideal of the autonomously determined self. (7-8)
Almost all of the above resonate with themes related to CT; one may argue
that the latter also depends “for its meaning and value on a particular order
of social relations, which it in turn reinforces” (7-8), it also arises in a
singular event fixing together otherwise heterogeneous elements, and the
mechanisms of belief it entails also involve a religious-like belief and
psychic investment. This is not to say that fetishism and paranoia cannot be
seen interacting with one another; fetishism can contain paranoid elements,
just like the classic fetish for the paranoiac has traditionally been the
“truth.” The fact that fetishism is not as commonly used as a cultural term
as we see with paranoia is largely due to the fact that, as a term, the former
is usually employed to describe abnormal sexual behavior or fixation with
parts of the human body and/or articles of clothing. Paranoia, on the other
hand, despite Freud’s conviction that it also originates in “abnormal”
sexual behavior, is broadly used as a hermeneutic tool for unorthodox
behavioral modes of thought. The truth might be the classic fetish for the
typical paranoid mind, but for CTs revolving around the assassination of
Kennedy, and specifically with Stone’s version of the event, we need to
consider a different set of questions in order to identify the mechanisms at
work. Truth in conspiracy is always “already lost,” because “it exists only
as a delusion of the paranoid who imagines it; the truth in conspiracy is
ambiguous and in the eye of the beholder, while the experience that is
fetishized and constantly called into question is the existence of conspiracy
itself” (Dick 26).11
In all its uses, fetishism describes a mediated relationship between a
subject and an object. In anthropological fetishism, in particular, Pietz
notes:
The fetish is always a meaningful fixation of a singular event; it
is above all a “historical” object, the enduring material form and
force of an unrepeatable event. This object is “territorialized” in
material space (an earthly matrix), whether in the form of a
geographical locality, … or a medium of inscription … This
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11. This is one of the very few texts I came across that employs the idea of the fetish as
an element of conspiracy narratives.
reified, territorialized historical object is also “personalized” in the
sense that beyond its status as a collective social object it evokes
an intensely personal response from individuals. (12)
The wide variety of literary and cinematic texts fixated on the Kennedy
assassination is a case in point. The “unrepeatable event” is repeated over
and over again in an almost ritualistic manner, seeking for rational
explanations as if trying to exorcize the demons of the past. In “Three
Types of Fetishism,” Lorraine Gammon and Merja Makinen point out that
a social purpose of fetishism is “to allay anxieties of the individual and
group and to promote social cohesion through joint rituals and common
belief” (17). This idea is very similar to those describing the social purpose
of CT. In Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar
America, Melley argues that the increasing tendency to attribute causality
to events stems from what he calls “agency panic,” a feeling of losing a
sense of autonomy and self-control (7). Conspiracy theories allay these types
of anxieties by creating a coherent narrative that eliminates ambivalence
about the world, even if it means exposing it for an evil and sinister place.
In a somewhat similar manner, fetishism is understood as a strategy for
negotiating loss, and as highlighted in Charles DeBrosses’ work, there are
national fetishes (shared delusions) and individual fetishes. The term may
have originated as a cross-cultural word about a cross-cultural relationship;
contemporary cultural scholars such as Gammon and Makinen employ
anthropological fetishism to discuss the behavioral modes of fans.12
In “Paranoia, Terrorism, and the Fictional Condition of Knowledge,”
Alan Nadel describes Dealy Plaza, the site of President Kennedy’s
assassination, as a sacred space that “pilgrims” and tourists will visit every
year. Nadel describes the place as “the sacred center of a ritual sacrifice …
and yet inundated by pedestrian traffic … It is the site of several commercial
enterprises, many of the most significant relying on texts that invest the
quotidian with historical excess” (407, my emphasis). The Texas Book
Depository hosts on the sixth floor the Kennedy Museum, as well as the
Kennedy Museum souvenir shop. Nadel points out that, 
[w]hile the plaza itself reads tragedy and conspiracy, the souvenir
shop invests Kennedy’s life (and by implication his death) with a
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12. The overwhelmingly popular conspiracy theories about figures like John F. Kennedy
or Princess Diana resonate with Lorraine Gammon and Merja Makinen’s study on
fans and fandom.
Mount Rushmore-like normality. Kennedy there becomes the
figural stuff of ashtrays, coffee-table books, and postcards; his
words can be purchased in cassette, CD, and print formats; his
image in varying qualities of reproduction can be taken home for
private display. (408)
As the visitors move from display to display, Nadel suggests that there is
one thing missing: the shooter.
When one looks out the fateful window and sees how sharply Elm
Street cuts its parameters, common sense suggests that the shooter
had to be missing, that is, no one using a (damaged) bolt-action
rifle could get off three accurate shots through that small window
of opportunity. The shooter, like the target, in other words, is
missing not only visually but also logically, historically, spatially,
temporally. In the shooter’s absence we have an overabundance of
narratives. (409, my emphases)
This is what some would agree, the “healthy” way of bringing the “true”
event closer to the self. For the conspiracy theorist, however, the “window”
is much more than a mere historical site. The Museum encapsulates the
“official” story of “what happened” on November 22, 1963. All he or she
can feel is what is missing, the lack of what should have been there but is
not. Conspiracy texts mediate and fill this perceived lack; they become a
way of negotiating the absence of the coveted shooter. In the process,
though, they overcompensate for the absence by producing an excess of
“shooters.” As was mentioned, paranoia is a form of assumed surplus
knowledge; based on this premise, we can understand why the conspiracy
theorist is readily identified as a paranoid individual. Excess of meaning,
though, is not only related to paranoia but to fetishism as well, and since one
of the basic diagnostic elements of paranoia is an intense fear for the self—
standing at the center of evil activity—how do we account for the fact that
the self is displaced in a periphery of safety and someone else is now at the
center as the object of intense persecution and hostility? 
Freud has been criticized for employing the terms “absence loss” and
“lack” interchangeably.13 His theory on fetishism idertifies its origins with
the little boy’s realization that the mother is missing a penis. Failing to
perceive it as absence (nothing was ever there), the boy experiences it as a
loss (it was there and now it is not) and translates it as a lack (it should be
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there). Castration anxiety (fear for the self) emerges—a form of paranoia on
the unconscious level—and the boy substitutes for the lack a random object
of his choice. The same can be said for CT; it originates in the inability to
accept that something was never there; in the attempt to fill the “empty”
space, the individual overcompensates through the hyper-production of a
conspiracy text that often entails randomly chosen villains. 
Disavowal can be defined as a discrepancy between knowledge and
belief: “I know the killer stood at the window perch, but yet ...” This is
somewhat different from what happens with fandom, but the mechanisms
underlying the behavior of the conspiracy theorist and the fan appear
similar. Gammon and Makinen argue that the cultural phenomenon of
fandom can be better understood through anthropological rather than
sexual fetishism in the manner in which the fans worship their idol of
choice. Fiske argues that, “… fandom is characterized by ‘discrimination,’
and since it involves choice, ‘productivity,’ since fans produce their own
‘texts,’ for example their bedrooms or hairstyles” (qtd. in Gammon and
Makinen 19). Here, it is obvious that the fans will create shrines of worship
and acquire memorabilia such as posters, ticket stubs, in an attempt to
evoke, through them, the presence of their absent idol (Gammon and
Makinen 20). Kennedy “fans” operate on a similar mode; they too, are
characterized by discrimination, choice, and productivity; but in this case
the “texts” they produce are not bedrooms or hairstyles, but conspiracy
texts that evoke the presence of the absent villain. In the case of fans, the
object of desire is more obvious; in the case of Kennedy conspiracies, the
object they are trying to evoke is not Kennedy, but the object of derision,
the villain. Do not both practices seem to be driven, though, by a similar
desire? There does not seem to be a specific mention of the fetish as only
an object of positive affect. If we accept Shumway’s assertion, as noted
earlier in this paper, that in all its uses fetishism describes the attribution of
strange powers to objects, then we can say that certain conspiratorial texts
attribute special powers to “evil” objects responsible for the loss of the
worshiped object, and seek to evoke and produce their presence in order to
alleviate anxiety, not to get closer in the manner that fans strive to produce
texts that will bring them closer to their idol. One of the best examples of
this tendency is, arguably, Stone’s JFK. In what follows, we will consider
elements that distinguish this particular “crisis” film from other visual texts
on the same subject.
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JFK: How to Do Conspiracy Theory with Fetishism
Stone’s JFK has been held as the ultimate cinematic conspiracy text of
the 1990s, and, for some, of the twentieth century.14 Since Kennedy’s
assassination in 1963, a variety of cinematic texts dealing, either directly or
indirectly, with the “seven seconds that broke the back of the American
century” (DeLillo 181),15 attempted to comment, interpret, and revisit this
highly traumatic event. Stone is no stranger to controversy, having directed
films such as Platoon (1986), Born on the Fourth of July (1989), and Nixon
(1995). Stone’s bombastic and vitriolic attitude towards political activity,
always reflected in his historical interpretations of postwar American politics,
has stirred public opinion in unprecedented ways. Soon after the film’s
release in 1991, and spurred into action by a community of Stone followers,
Congress passes, and President George Bush signs into law, the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. According to
Michael L. Kurtz, the act “mandated the appointment by the president of an
Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), whose responsibility was to
locate, identify, review, and release all assassination records as expeditiously
as possible.”16 Film critics and historians alike vehemently condemned the
film as an egregious example of moral relativism and liberal propaganda, a
contaminant of history infested with historical inaccuracies, an example of a
sheer manipulation of the cinematic apparatus and its essential photographic
properties.17 With the front cover of Newsweek, for instance, featuring the title
“The Twisted Truth of JFK: Why Oliver Stone’s New Movie Can’t Be
Trusted,” the media began reacting to Stone’s paranoia with a rhetoric
characterized by the very paranoid elements they were trying to attack.
Norman Mailer sees JFK as the classic of the conspiracy genre and unique in
its treatment of “the great paranoid myth of our times” (qtd. in McArthur 40). 
No other film has quenched the spectators’ thirst for knowledge and
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14. See Fenster; Simon; and Lardner.
15. Don DeLillo’s famous quote in Libra (1988).
16. Michael L. Kurtz in “Oliver Stone, JFK, and History” notes that Congress held
public hearings during the spring and summer of 1992 and discovered, to their
surprise, that there was indeed a voluminous amount of documentary and other
evidence relating to the assassination that various agencies had deliberately withheld
from the public record (166-77). 
17. Oliver Stone blends historical footage with dramatic footage in a manner that makes
the two hard to distinguish. Montage sequences, flashbacks, and rapid cuts form a
narrative that conflates the fictional and the historical. The Zapruder film, in particular,
and the way Stone incorporates it into the narrative, has been a source of criticism. 
information as much as JFK. Balancing the focus of the perennial question
of “What happened?” with that of “Why it happened?”, it shifts the focus
from the villains to the victim. A text that focuses on the “why” as much as
on the “what” operates on two assumptions: first, that the victim embodied
unique powers that made him both special and especially dangerous;
second, that a community of villains joins forces to obliterate the worshiped
object in question. What appears as most “fetishistic” about this film, as we
shall see, is the discourse and the representational modes of Stone’s CT. 
The film opens in a highly provocative manner, with Stone
constructing his own historical trajectory of events leading up to and
culminating with Kennedy’s death, using actual footage and voice-over
narration of the historical context. Thus, he basically begins at the end, as
the exposition he provides is supposed to allude to the reasons as to why
the president was assassinated. Stone opens with Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
famous farewell address of 1961 where the latter prophetically warns the
nation about the potential threat posed by a growing military-industrial
complex. This “crash course” in postwar American history comprises of
shots of Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Fidel Castro, Teddy, Rose, and
Joe Kennedy; Jackie, John, and their children in intimate family moments
(the only shots in color in this opening sequence; all other shots are
taken from real footage in black and white); the Cuban Missile Crisis;
the Bay of Pigs invasion; shots of J. Edgar Hoover, images of Laos and
Vietnam, all in all everyone and everything that, according to Stone,
contributed to Kennedy’s death. This montage sequence relies primarily on
the paranoid style of establishing clear and simplified cause/effect
relations, and understanding history as a linear chain of interconnected and
interrelated events. The “Eisensteinean” brush is slightly evident in this
montage sequence, not because of the rapid rhythm and violent cuts of the
juxtaposing images, but mainly because of the insertion of suggestive
extra-diegetic elements such as a poster of Kennedy reading “Wanted for
Treason.” Ambiguity is eliminated in the same manner that Eisenstein
made sure that his images would be read in a very specific way. 
As already mentioned, Stone establishes Kennedy, right from the
beginning of the film—using voice-over narration—as much more than the
new president: he is “the symbol of the new 1960s, signifying change
and upheaval to the American public.” The multiple facets of Kennedy as
father to the nation and to his children, as a much anticipated “messiah”
who would magically bring America into a new era of politics that
promised the eradication of corruption and injustice, the elimination of
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war and conflict, and the potential of a utopian society, humanize Kennedy
as much as dehumanize him. Let me explain. In The Sublime Object of
Ideology (1989), Slavoj ÎiÏek offers a valuable analysis as to the reasons
why the Titanic became the source of such deep cultural trauma: 
“… the wreck of the Titanic,” he explains, “made such a
tremendous impact not because of the immediate material
dimensions of the catastrophe but because of its symbolic over-
determination, because of the ideological meaning invested in it: it
was read as a ‘symbol,’ as a condensed, metaphorical representation
of the approaching catastrophe of European civilization itself.” (70)
He goes on to note that “[t]he Titanic is a Thing in the Lacanian sense:
the material leftover, the materialization of the terrifying, impossible
jouissance, a kind of petrified forest of enjoyment … the wreck of the
Titanic therefore functions as a sublime object: a positive material object
elevated to the status of the impossible Thing” (71). JFK paints Kennedy
with the idealized colors of a symbolic, benevolent presence whose
destruction changed the direction of history and politics on a global scale.
What makes, thus, JFK stand separate from most conspiracy narratives on
the same subject is Stone’s determination to not only represent the villains
as a ruthless conglomerate of sinister powers, but more importantly to
absolve Kennedy of any wrongdoing whatsoever, elevating him to the
status of a ÎiÏekian sublime object.18 Kennedy’s re-invention as the
apotheosis of virtue and selflessness is as excessive, if not more, as the
villains’ degeneracy. It is the deification of Kennedy that is unique in
Stone’s film and not the multiple conspiracy scenarios in question. This
representation cannot be adequately explored through the paranoid model; it
is rather a manifestation of an extreme form of anthropological fetishism.
In addition to this construction of hyperbolic binaries of extreme good
and evil, what becomes also a source of frustration is the fact that “…
Stone’s ‘history’ reflects a desire for multiple alternative histories and a
single plot” (O’ Donnell 22).19 The opening sequence of JFK is immediately
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18. Up until JFK, films dealing with the Kennedy assassination remained mainly within
the paranoid mode of storytelling. Executive Action (Dir. David Miller, 1973), The
Parallax View (Dir. Allan J. Pakula, 1974), Winter Kills (Dir. William Richert,
1983), Interview with the Assassin (Dir. Neil Burger, 2002), are all examples of the
conspiracy genre informed by the structure and aesthetics of the paranoid narrative. 
19. Patrick O’Donnell discusses JFK as an example of a paradox where “the
contradiction resides in the formation of the assassination in the cultural imaginary
followed by a black and white dramatic sequence of a hysterical woman
being thrown violently out of a car; a cut to a hospital bed where the woman
frantically pleads with a policeman to do something because “They’ve gone
to Dallas … Friday … they’re gonna kill Kennedy … call somebody! …
stop them! … these are serious fucking guys! …” (JFK). A cut to Dallas,
Texas, November 22, 1963. President Kennedy’s motorcade reaches Dealy
Plaza; violent editing suggests or, rather, signals the violence that is about
to happen. When we come to the fatal moment of the shooting, we hear three
shots, and the screen suggestively fades to black. This is the first indication
that something/someone is missing; soon after, though, the screen begins to
overspill with villainous figures acting suspiciously, mincing their words,
betraying guilt. The film reads not as “Who killed Kennedy?” but rather as
“Who didn’t kill Kennedy?”; Stone, overcompensating for the perceived
loss of the shooter, does not spare anyone; from chiefs of police, to common
crooks, to male prostitutes, to Lyndon Johnson, Fidel Castro, the C.I.A., the
Pentagon, everyone shares part of the guilt, everyone wanted Kennedy dead
for their own personal purposes. The multiple villains are stereotyped as
such in a number of ways, the most obvious being the manner in which their
“otherness” is communicated visually through grotesque representations:
David Ferrie’s ludicrous painted eyebrows and ridiculous wig; Clay Shaw’s
comical mannerisms as an elderly active homosexual; Willie O’Keefe, the
male prostitute, and his perverse personality. The fact that Clay Shaw and
David Ferrie are not fictional characters and were actual homosexuals is not
to be overlooked. Willie O’Keefe, however, is a fictional character made up
by Stone.20 In an interview to Mark C. Carnes, Stone discusses Kennedy as
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as a discrete moment that arbitrarily anchors history while, at the same time,
serving as the origin of a chain of events whose significance becomes clear only in
the aftermath and in a determined relation to the original event” (22). Paranoid
thought is characterized by the desire to transform the multiple and heterogeneous
into a singular homogeneous, which in turn translates into the paradoxical
relationship it holds to modernism and postmodernism.
20. In an interview to Gary Crowdus, Stone notes: 
… Willie O’Keefe, who was played by Kevin Bacon, is a fictitious character. I used
him because there were about five homosexual characters involved in the
relationship of Clay Shaw with Oswald and David Ferrie. It was impossible,
however, given the length of the movie and the complexity of the relationship, to
describe five characters, and there was not one significant character from the five
who stood out. In my mind, that necessitated a fictitious character to represent all
five, to represent the basic conclusions of the five homosexuals that Garrison
involved in the trial, and some of whom he’d gotten to testify. (26)
a man that “pissed off ‘the Beast,’ the Beast being a force (or forces) greater
than the presidency” (4). 
Garrison’s fixation on Kennedy, as is the case with most “lone”
crusaders, is deeply affecting his relationship with his wife, Liz Garrison
(played by Sissy Spacek). In The Desirable Body: Cultural Fetishism and
the Erotics of Consumption (2001), Jon Stratton notes that 
… the key experience of cultural fetishism is a male pre-
occupation with his perceived phallic lack … the desire for
women becomes secondary … the desire for the phallus translates
into a complex form of male-male desire which excludes women
as women, their bodies marked by the “lack,” even, of the penis,
including those bodies remade as phallic fetishes … [T]his male-
male desire takes two forms. One is a scheme of narcissistic
identification with a man considered to have the phallic,
patriarchal quality. The other constructs certain males as phallic
substitutes who may, then, be “consumed” in the hope that they
will provide the missing phallus. (116) 
Garrison’s “paranoia”—which manifests itself as excessive knowledge and
cognitive hyper-productivity (through the use of flashbacks) that validate
Garrison or discredit the army of villains—is the first element to cause a rift
between him and Liz. Paranoia, according to Freud—is primarily a product
of a male latent homosexual desire. In 1915, Freud discusses briefly a case
of female paranoia through the same theoretical framework he used for
Schreber.21 From a psychoanalytic perspective, women might or might not
have what it takes to be paranoid, but they certainly do not when it comes
to fetishism. According to Freud fetishism is strictly a male affair. Stratton’s
observations are useful in exploring how Stone constructs Jim Garrison in
his private domain. When Liz tries to “seduce” him suggesting a romantic
night of sexual (but always wholesome) delights, Garrison prefers to
spend the night with Kennedy and voraciously consume all twenty-six
volumes of the Warren Commission Report, a feat that Liz tells us only
he has done; no one else has ever read the “virginal” Report cover to
cover before. Time and time again Garrison will refer to Kennedy as the
“slain king” or to the jury/audience as “children of a slain father.” Garrison
frantically “consumes” the Report in hopes of providing/evoking the
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21. See Freud, “A Case of Female Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytical
Theory of the Disease” 150-61.
missing phallus; his noble quest for justice mirrors Kennedy’s noble causes
for which he was eventually destroyed. Kennedy as the benevolent
patriarch, whose death completely and utterly disrupts the symbolic order,
is re-incarnated in Garrison, whose narcissistic disposition seeks to identify
with the president’s “phallic, patriarchal quality” (Stratton 116). As long
as Liz refuses to acknowledge Garrison as the “subject supposed to know”
the couple shares no sexual intimacy; if anything, they are drifting further
and further apart. She, of course, being excluded from fetishistic desire,
cannot even begin to relate to her husband’s state of mind. Interestingly,
order is restored in Garrison’s private sphere/bed immediately following a
moment of sheer disorder in the public sphere: the assassination of Robert
F. Kennedy captured on television. As soon as Jim informs Liz of the tragic
event (which he, incidentally, had prophesized only a few hours before!),
Aristotelian anagnorisis kicks in and the couple, now basking in
homophrosune, share an intimate night of passion. No longer feeling the
threat of being a “castrated man,” Garrison is able to find his way back into
his wife’s bed once again.
The camera work in the film is also highly suggestive of the
“fetishization” of the villains. On various occasions, the camera zooms to
extreme close-ups of the villains’ body parts. After Kennedy’s death, as we
see documentary footage of Johnson being sworn president, the camera
closes in on his hand in a suggestive way of saying that he had his “hand”
in it too; as Garrison interviews the characters played by John Candy and
Jack Lemmon, we get extreme close-ups of their mouth and eyes
respectively, which suggest the synecdochical relation they might be
holding to the “Beast.” 
Perhaps the most frustrating object in the Kennedy affair has been,
and still is, the Zapruder film, the visual document that accidentally
captured the truth but obstinately refused to reveal it. As in real life (the
Zapruder film was not released to the public until 1975), Stone withholds
the home video from his audience until the trial sequence at the end,
when Garrison is unfolding the “truth” about what really happened, and
successfully postponing our long awaited (JFK is almost three-and-a half
hours long) gratification. Zapruder is portrayed as a deus ex machina, the
fourth “shooter” no one saw coming. In the opening sequence, Stone
dramatically re-enacts Zapruder “shooting” Kennedy, juxtaposing his image
with the invisible presence of the three other shooters. This parallelism also
aligns “truth” with the figure of the filmmaker, the benevolent “shooter” as
the possessor of historical accuracy. 
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Stone makes Zapruder himself visible on screen and the conspirators
invisible right from the start, playing on the tension between visibility (as
good) and invisibility (as a threat), what is missing and what is not. “The
inability of the documentary photographic image,” Marita Sturken argues,
“to reveal the reasons for the Kennedy assassination constituted a kind of
cultural trauma. A film such as JFK responds to the inability of the image
to provide answers by ‘filling in’ what the image could not tell, and
attempting to complete the fragmented images of memory” (73). The
Zapruder film contains a “truth” we believe is there but cannot access. It has
to be another film, JFK, that comes in to magically fill in for this essential
lack, taking on the role of a metanarrative. Despite its inability to bring
closure to the cultural trauma, or perhaps because of it, the home video itself
has gained a kind of sacred status in American culture. The Zapruder film is
shown in JFK as evidence that supposedly discredits the “magic bullet”
theory. The Warren Commission’s historiographic legitimacy is put under
the microscope, becoming vulnerable to such attacks, precisely because the
weaving of the events that eventually prevailed as the official history was
done in a manner that assigned almost supernatural (magical), or to borrow
Stone’s epithet, “ridiculous” properties and abilities to an object—a single
bullet—that went beyond the realm of the rational, the logical.
O’Keefe’s embodiment of the five male homosexuals, Stone’s
rhetorical choices, aspects of the work itself, and especially, Garrison’s
fixation with Kennedy are manifestations of a discourse driven primarily by
fetishism. Borrowing again from Gammon and Makinen, the linguistic
implications are not without significance; “fetishism” they note, “is itself a
synecdoche (a part for the whole substitution)” (44). Each body part stands
in for the role each individual had in the Kennedy assassination: one is the
hand, the other is the eyes, another is the mouth, and so on and so forth. The
parts of each make up the whole of the Beast, a supernatural force standing
against everything that is holy and moral. The representation of brutish,
non-Christian “otherness” culminates with the elaborate orgy scene; the
villainous men are dressed up in eighteenth-century aristocracy costumes,
while one of them has his entire body painted in a shiny gold color that
resembles a statue of a Greek god. Immediately after, there is a cut to the
Garrison family enjoying a nice, wholesome dinner on Easter Sunday,
establishing an even more obvious dialectic between the virtuous nuclear
family and the perverse group of homosexual villains. 
Another interesting instance of a fetishistic representation of otherness
is David Ferrie’s apartment. After his murder, the team of crusaders led by
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Garrison visits Ferrie’s apartment. The camera pans through the entire space
which is filled with articles associated with mystical religious rituals; we
enter a dark-lit room hosting a skeleton, a cross, a picture of the pope, beads,
mice, needles, cigarette buds, and pills; moving to the next room, we see a
boudoir covered with different kinds of make-up, wigs, and a picture of a
naked man from the waste up. Stone’s attempt to establish the “other” by
creating a shrine-like space of paganistic or even “voodoo” practices is
similar to the manner Western Europeans imagined the ritual practices of
the African people of the seventeenth century. Mr. X, the film’s deus ex
machina, appears out of nowhere to consolidate Garrison’s theory; for
many, this mystical nameless figure stands for the director himself who,
through this character, is able to unravel his own unconfirmed but highly
compelling story.22 It is Mr. X who asks the question: “Why did they want
Kennedy dead?” Oliver Stone produces an elaborate response to the
question of “What happened?” but leaves the key question “open” for the
audience to decide; or, so he claims. Most would agree that there is nothing
“open” about JFK; if anything, the film eliminates all ambiguity,
something that becomes a source of both pleasure and unpleasure. When at
the end of his elaborate closing arguments Garrison looks straight at the
camera—automatically placing the spectator in the position of the diegetic
jury—and says the, now, infamous “It’s up to you,” Stone violated much
more than the cinematic rules of realism: by breaking down the “fourth
wall” he managed to erect a much stronger one between the characters and
the audience. 
What is it that caused such emotional reactions (of both positive and
negative affect)? I believe that it is Kennedy’s representation as a sacred
object that places the film in a category by itself. And, how does Stone
achieve this? Put simply: the “what happened” is addressed through
paranoia; the “why it happened” through fetishism. Since Kennedy’s death,
cinema has been an active participant in what I would like to call the
Kennedy Complex, a love-hate relationship between the American public
and its most beloved “Father” who died prematurely by the hand of one (or
many more?) of his own “children,” materializing the Oedipal fantasy. 
Most films on this subject have abstained from two things: creating an
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22. Mr. X is a fictional character based, in part, on an actual person, Col. Fletcher Prouty,
who had been chief of special operations during the Kennedy years. Prouty has stated
that Kennedy was, indeed, planning to withdraw the troops from Vietnam, but most
of Mr. X’s “soliloquy” is Stone’s elaborate interpretation of Prouty’s statements. 
overarching, all-inclusive community of villains—which speaks directly
to fetishism’s excess—and portraying Kennedy as a Christ-like figure—
which speaks to fetishism’s tendency to infuse objects/subjects with special
meaning.23 Instead they remain within the conventional conspiratorial
narrative modeled after the paranoid form of storytelling. Paranoia may also
be characterized by excess, but in this case it is the worship of another
individual that produces this alternate universe, not the worship of the self.
What is more, by weaving all conspiracy theories (C.I.A., the Pentagon,
Castro, F.B.I., Lyndon Johnson, etc.) into a single narrative, Stone ends
up canceling them out and closing up the subject. His treatment of
Kennedy as a sacred object makes any harsh criticisms against him almost
sacrilegious. Paranoia emerges as ideological rather than pathological,
mainly because the same rhetoric is employed by both sides, but whereas
with Garrison it translates as the words of a brilliant mind, with Ferrie, for
instance, it translates as the words of an irrational psychotic. Just like
Kennedy, Garrison is an infallible man, the only “genuine” son to recognize
his “Father’s” specialness as well as his enemies. This form of rhetoric so
deeply invested in religious imagery and religious parables, proudly stands
against the secular Warren Commission Report as a sacred document that
“infidels” might question but faithful followers will religiously and, above
all, unquestionably embrace. One might say that JFK is a manifestation of
anthropological fetishism at its best and worst.
Conclusions
This essay identifies and introduces fetishism as a third component, an
active participant in the formation of conspiratorial, crisis texts that have
previously been examined primarily through the theoretical framework of
paranoia. This distinct mode of representation we might call fetishistic
paranoia. One might wonder why this is important; after all, CT and,
especially, Stone’s film, whether a product of fetishism or paranoia, still
remain, for most, the products of “distorted” minds. This is important, I
believe, for the following reasons: first and foremost, conspiracy theory in
general, and in film in particular, is far too popular a phenomenon to be
underestimated. More and more we have come to rely on, deal with crisis,
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23. I am referring to films such as Executive Action (Dir. David Miller, 1973), The
Parallax View (Dir. Alan J. Pakula, 1974), Winter Kills (Dir. William Richert, 1979),
and the more recent Interview with the Assassin (Dir. Neil Burger, 2002).
and understand history through the conspiratorial lens, to the point where
paranoid thought is gradually becoming “naturalized” rather than
exceptional. Second, when a phenomenon becomes so prevalent, engaging in
an over-simplified dismissive discourse can be as dangerous as the narratives
in question. Third, when the pathological condition of paranoia is perceived
invariably as the sole (or main) justification for the emergence of such
theories, and the only theoretical model through which they can be explored,
this attitude tends to homogenize them in an over-generalized and limited
manner. Conspiracy equals paranoia is as rigid a cause/effect relationship
as those that the putative narratives establish. Finally, in order to gain a
deeper and better understanding of the underlying defense mechanisms and
structures against crises that give rise to this popular mode of thought and
introduce other dimensions that contribute to its formation, we need to
evaluate these narratives within their respective socio-historical contexts. In
Kennedy’s case, fetishism works on multiple levels; it can be seen as both the
driving force that compels individuals to remain fixated on an event that took
place more than forty years ago, and a way of structuring and representing
the Beast, the supernatural entity with the power to destroy the object of
special devotion. We can identify elements of both anthropological and
psychoanalytic fetishism. The former is employed as a mode of representing
otherness; the latter seems to explain the force that drives the production of
conspiratorial texts. 
American literature and film have responded to the Kennedy
assassination—for some being a national disaster and for others a global
crisis—in a variety of ways during the past four decades. Authors and
filmmakers revisit and re-interpret the historical event, they question it, they
respond forcefully, critically, emotionally, but above all, artistically to it.
These precious cultural documents—visual and/or literary—do much more
that merely open Pandora’s Box and release uncomfortable ghosts from the
past. They also facilitate an understanding of ourselves—readers and
audiences—of ways we invent, strategies we adopt, notions and ideas we
internalize and then proceed to naturalize. 
Richard Hofstadter, in his seminal work The Paranoid Style in
American Politics and Other Essays (1966), identifies a pattern in political
rhetoric which he describes as “the paranoid style” that “… represents an
old and recurrent mode of expression in our public life which has frequently
been linked with movements of suspicious discontent, and whose content
remains much the same even when it is adopted by men of distinctly
different purposes” (6). In establishing the reality of the style, Hofstadter
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uses excerpts from political speeches taken from intervals of half a century,
illustrating the fact that people and crises may come and go but the
discourse always stays the same. Examples include a speech delivered by
Senator McCarthy in June 1951, a manifesto signed in 1895 by leaders of
the Populist party, a Texas newspaper article written in 1855, and a sermon
preached in Massachusetts in 1798. I would like to argue that we also have
adopted a “fetishistic” style for coping with crisis and relating to the world,
both through patterns of discourse and through a naturalized perception of
the social order which can mask the fetishism at work. The paranoid style
might be a popular way of making sense of the world, but the fetishistic style
becomes a way of relating to it. 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Greece
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